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This article assesses train speeds in England and Wales 1843–1912. Trains were 
fast compared with coaches or walking, and the social saving of time saved grew 
over time to become over 10 percent of national income in 1912. Including fare 
savings as well, social savings were 14 percent of national income in 1912, with 
consumer surplus of 6 percent. Time savings dominated fare savings once rail-
ways became a new good: travel for the masses. Using the social savings-total 
factor productivity identity, we show that railways accounted for around a sixth 
of economy-wide productivity growth in this era. 
ne of the defining characteristics of the industrial revolution and its 
aftermath was the increasing opportunities for travel. Although 
better roads and better carriage design had increased attainable speeds 
before the transport revolution, they remained restricted by the physical 
limitations of the horses that powered them. On water, sailors remained 
at the mercy of the wind.
1
 The industrial revolution changed both. 
Railways allowed overland travel that was faster than anyone had pre-
viously believed possible, and steamships meant that coastal and inter-
national travel was now not only faster but much more predictable. By 
1871, Britain had over 13,000 miles of railway track, and by 1891 the 
average person in Britain took the train every other week.
2
 This, then, 
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was an era of dramatic and unprecedented improvements in transport. In 
this article we use modern economic techniques to value the time saved 
by railway passengers in England and Wales between 1843 and 1912. 
 Improvements in passenger transport technology can have many ef-
fects: raising or lowering costs, speeding it up or slowing it down, mak-
ing it more or less comfortable, and leading to more or fewer deaths and 
injuries. The correct way to analyze transport improvements, ex ante 
and ex post, is via cost-benefit analysis. In recent years governments 
and others have improved the quality of such analyses; in this article we 
apply those insights historically.
3
 Cost-benefit analysis starts from the 
premise that the benefit of passenger transport is getting from one place 
to another, or, more generally, transporting one person one mile. Costs 
consist of monetary and nonmonetary costs, which, once nonmonetary 
components have been given monetary values, are added together to 
make “generalized costs.” The most important nonmonetary cost is the 
value of time, which should vary with the type of person traveling, the 
reason for travel, and the comfort of the mode of transport used, and 
should include waiting as well as traveling time.
4
 Economic theory states that an individual’s valuation of time is the 
opportunity cost, that is the value of the alternative use for that time. 
For those traveling on work time, the value of an hour saved is the 
hourly employment cost, because if travel were instantaneous, an hour 
of travel could be replaced by an hour’s productive work.
5
 Neo-classical 
economics holds that workers value leisure time at their take-home 
wage rate. If they value it less, they should work for longer, if they 
value it more, they should reduce their working hours. In fact both re-
vealed-preference and willingness-to-pay studies show that people 
value their leisure and commuting time at around half their take-home 
hourly wage.
6
 That time savings are not included in GDP is not of concern to 
economists and economic historians. Our interest is in consumer wel-
3 See, for example, the websites of the Department for Transport’s Transport Analysis Guid-
ance, available at www.webtag.org.uk; and Leeds University’s Institute for Transport Studies, 
www.its.leeds.ac.uk. 
4 Great Britain, Transport, pp. 196–97. 
5 Costs include gross wages, payroll taxes, and employer pension contributions, as well as a 
share of overhead costs (office space, back office functions, and so on), which add 21.2 percent 
today. Where an individual’s wages are unknown, the usual proxy is the average wage for users 
of that transport mode. Department for Transport, “Values,” p. 2, paragraph 1.2.4 and p. 4,  
table 1. 
6 The U.K. government currently values leisure and commuting time at 46 percent of average 
take-home wages. This is for working age people and pensioners, with the latter’s valuation 25 
percent lower than the former’s. In order to correct for the lower ratio of pensioners to working 
age people in the nineteenth century, we increase the overall figure by 4 percentage points, to 50 
percent of the take-home wage. Ibid., paragraph 1.2.17. 
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fare gains from new technology, whatever form those gains take. If they 
are valued by consumers then they are part of consumer surplus, if they 
are part of consumer surplus then they should be included in cost-
benefit analysis.
7
 In addition to the transport costs and benefits that ac-
crue to users, there may be externalities to those who do not travel at all. 
Better transport can destroy local monopolies and increase productivity 
through agglomeration effects, it can also change the rates at which 
nonusers are killed or injured, and affect levels of local and global pol-
lution. These additional factors would need to be included in a calcula-
tion of the full economic effect, but lie outside the scope of this article, 
which, in keeping with earlier historical studies, seeks to estimate the 
transport costs and benefits. 
 The form of cost-benefit analysis used by historians to study railways 
is known as “social savings.” This approach was first used in the 1960s 
in the pioneering works of Robert Fogel and Albert Fishlow.
8
 Their 
studies aimed to quantify the value of railways to the United States in 
1890 and 1859, respectively. Put simply, the social saving from rail-
ways is the minimum additional amount that society would have to pay 
to do what the railways did, without them, that is, the cost of moving 
freight and passengers without trains. Social saving thus measures the 
fall in resources required to provide a given level of output. It is analo-
gous to total factor productivity growth, because, under competitive 
conditions, TFP growth is equivalent to a fall in the cost of providing 
output. Thus social savings are a measure of the contribution of techno-
logical change to productivity growth. This means that we can divide 
the social saving estimate by economy-wide total factor productivity 
growth to find the contribution of railways to overall total factor pro-
ductivity growth.
9
 The social saving methodology, as used by Fogel, Fishlow, and Gary 
Hawke in their original studies measures the cost to society of doing ex-
actly what it did with the railways, without them. Elementary econom-
ics tells us that quantity demanded rises as price falls, and thus, because 
prices were lower in the railway era, the social saving will overstate the 
benefit of railways to society: some people would not have been willing 
to pay the higher price to travel. The extent to which travel increases 
depends on the (generalized) price elasticity of demand, which is (im-
plicitly) assumed to be zero in the social saving methodology. Fogel 
sets out the formula to convert the social saving into the increase in 
consumer surplus, according to different estimates of the elasticity of 
7 Great Britain, Transport, 3.10–3.12, pp. 57–58. 
8 Fogel, Railroads; and Fishlow, American Railroads.




 We discuss an appropriate estimate of elasticity later in the 
article, and convert our estimates of social savings into consumer surplus. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 Hawke calculated the social savings from goods and passenger travel 
for English and Welsh railways from 1840 to 1870, with particular em-
phasis on 1865. Hawke’s passenger methodology is simple and correct. 
He finds the distance people traveled in each class and assesses the 
means by which they would otherwise have traveled. He then finds the 
total cost by each method, with the difference representing the social 
saving. This is calculated as either 2.1 percent or 5.8 percent of GDP, 
depending on whether first-class rail is held to be as comfortable as the 
inside of a stage coach, or traveling by private carriage, generally 
known as a post-chaise.
11
 Hawke argues that the latter is more represen-
tative of the facilities and comfort offered by first-class travel in 1865. 
 These findings have not gone unchallenged. In his review William 
Baker notes that Hawke’s social saving estimate is roughly double those 
of Fogel and Fishlow, with much of the difference coming from 
“Hawke’s attempt to quantify the greater convenience and comfort of 
rail over non-rail passenger service.”
12
 He adds “Here this reviewer is 
not convinced.”
13
 Similarly, Fishlow notes that “the largest part of the 
cost savings emanate from reduced fares for personal travel (in particu-
lar first class accommodations).”
14
 Noting that post chaise costs, at six 
times coaching costs, seem exceptionally high, Fishlow recalibrates 
Hawke’s social savings figures with an arbitrary lower cost of posting, 
and finds that social savings fall by one half. This leads him to comment 
that “it is disquieting to discover how sensitive the calculations of social 
savings are to modest, and apparently reasonable, changes in Hawke’s 
underlying assumptions.” Terry Gourvish is more critical, arguing that 


























St  (12) 
Where St is the true social saving, and S0 the zero elasticity social saving already calculated, ?
the elasticity, and ? the ratio of prices without railways to with railways. The intuition is that the 
higher the price ratio, the more journeys will not now take place. 
11 Hawke, Railways, pp. 48–49, table II.02. The figure of 2.1 percent is incorrect; it should be 
1.6 percent as given on p. 44. 
12 Baker, “Railways,” pp. 718–19. 
13 Ibid., p. 719. 
14 Fishlow, “Railways,” pp. 75–76. 
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all we can safely conclude is that the actual value for passenger social 
savings lies between 0.6 percent and 14.2 percent of GDP, bounds so 
wide as to tell us nothing about the value of railways to passengers.
15
 Hawke does not include any benefit for time savings, arguing that in-
flexibility of working hours meant that few workers were able to use the 
additional time saved to work, so it is likely that it was primarily lei-
sure, not production that increased. That said, he acknowledges that ex-
cluding time savings imparts a downward bias, in that some travel was 
for business purposes, and clearly faster journey times did allow greater 
production. He argues that this bias is likely to have been small, given 
that the majority of miles traveled were third class. He also argues that 
because workers did not have a choice as to working hours, the theo-
retical construct that workers value leisure at the wage rate is invalid, 
and therefore he regards such time saved as worthless. Finally, he notes 
that if we are to compare leisure time savings with GNP, we would need 
to include the valuation of all leisure time in our estimate of GNP. 
 Hayden Boyd and Gary Walton, who estimate the social saving from 
faster passenger rail travel in the United States in 1890, argue that it is 
legitimate to compare the value of time saved with money GNP provid-
ing that we interpret the social saving result carefully. They note that 
because much of the social saving from faster passenger travel comes 
from increased leisure time, the social saving “measure does not show 
how much GNP would have been reduced if the railroad had not been 
available to travellers. It does show in the aggregate the percentage of 
GNP travellers in 1890 would have been willing to exchange for the 
opportunity of travelling by rail rather than by the next best alterna-
tive.”
16
 This is in keeping with modern transport economics, which al-
ways includes the value of leisure time saved, on the clearly correct 
grounds that people value leisure time.
17
 Boyd and Walton note that, contrary to Fishlow’s assumption, it was 
cheaper to travel by canal and steam boat than by railway, and yet peo-
ple overwhelmingly chose to travel by train. They note that an analysis 
including only fares would generate the clearly incorrect result that pas-
senger rail travel created negative social savings. That people chose to 
use the more expensive railway rather than the cheaper boat must mean 
that people were prepared to pay to save time, and therefore that eco-
nomic historians should include that valuation in their estimate of social 
savings.
15 Gourvish, Railways, pp. 58–59, expressed here as a percentage of U.K. GDP for ease of 
comparison. 
16 Boyd and Walton, “Social Savings,” p. 240. 
17 A good discussion can be found in Harrison and Quarmby, “Value.” 
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 This article revises and extends Hawke’s social savings for passenger 
rail travel in England and Wales. It seeks to achieve five things. First, to 
use modern economics to value the time saved. Second, to improve the 
quality of Hawke’s analysis of the monetary savings available from 
railways for 1865. Third, to extend the time and money social savings 
estimates to cover the period 1843 to 1912. Fourth, to divide social sav-
ings into money and time components, and between premium and third-
class passengers. Finally, to express the social savings from passenger 
rail transport as a proportion of economy-wide total factor productivity 
growth. This article generates a better understanding of this new tech-
nology’s nature, the sources of its welfare gains and the distribution of 
those gains. As the period progressed, time savings became relatively 
more important relative to fare savings. This was not so much because 
trains became quicker—although they did—but rather because over 
time an increasing number of passengers were drawn from poorer sec-
tions of society, whose only other realistic method of travel was to 
walk. By 1912 passenger railways’ social saving was 14 percent of 
GDP, of which 10 percent came from time saved, and 4 percent from 
reductions in fares. 
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SAVINGS IN 1865 
 A social savings calculation requires an alternative, counterfactual, 
mode of transport. Hawke uses two different counterfactuals, one based 
on Lardner’s book—first-class rail equivalent to inside a stage coach, 
other classes to seats outside the coach—and another based on the 1867 
Royal Commission report—equating first-class rail with traveling post 
chaise, second-class with inside the stage coach, and third-class with 
outside it. Hawke uses Lardner’s comparison for years up to 1850, and 
that of the Royal Commission for years from 1865, with a linear transi-
tion from one “comfort comparison” to the other, reflecting the steady 
relative improvement in railway comfort. Philip Bagwell shows that 
posting passenger miles were almost as high as coaching miles prior to 
the railway age, and that the number of post horses went down rapidly 
after the introduction of railway services. It seems most plausible, there-
fore, that first-class rail travel replaced posting as soon as the railway 
began. We therefore prefer the Royal Commission approach to that of 
Lardner, and use it throughout this article.
18
18 Hawke argues that the nature of rail journeys meant that the only alternative was coaching, 
with sea transport essentially irrelevant. In any case, steam ships depended on essentially the 
same technology as railways, so a counterfactual of steam ships but not railways has little intui-
tive appeal. 
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 We argue, however, that third-class passengers would not, in the ab-
sence of the railways, have traveled by coach, but would instead have 
walked. Although both Lardner and the Royal Commission base their 
third-class comparisons on outside coach fares, there is ample evidence 
that the sort of people who traveled third class would never have been 
coach travelers, evidence noted by Eddie Hunt and acknowledged by 
Hawke.
19
 The Royal Commission itself noted this, arguing that “The 
poorer classes have benefited most in regard to speed, because formerly 
they had no means of travelling except by wagon or on foot.”
20
 This is in 
keeping with evidence given to various parliamentary enquires. For ex-
ample, Sir Rowland Hill, when describing the improvements brought 
about by railways, notes that “even those whose best attainable means of 
travelling were wagons proceeding at the rate of two or three miles an 
hour, are now conveyed by third-class carriages in tolerable comfort and 
with great speed.”
21
 G. Duncan, the Director of the Dundee and Arbroath 
Railway, when asked how his third-class passengers would have traveled 
without the railways, stated “They had no means but going by the carri-
ers’ carts or walking.”
22
 Captain Lawes, of the Manchester and Leeds 
Railroad, stated that third class on that railway was made up primarily of 
handloom weavers who would otherwise have had to walk into Manches-
ter once a week, saving at least half a day per weaver per week.
23
Miles Traveled 
 The first step in estimating social savings is to assess the number of 
passenger miles traveled in each class in 1865. Hawke takes the total 
railway receipts and average fares by class in England and Wales from 
the Railway Returns. These data are as authoritative as any nineteenth-
century data. Dividing receipts by the fare per mile gives the number of 
miles traveled. There are, as Hawke notes, “some complications.”
24
These include return tickets, which had lower prices per mile, and ex-
press tickets, which had higher prices. Hawke’s assumptions to over-
come these problems are plausible, and the effects slight. The Railway 
Returns also give total revenues for season ticket holders, which represent 
3 percent of total revenues in 1865. The division of season ticket revenues 
19 Hawke, “Railway Passenger Traffic”; and Hunt, “Review.” 
20 Parliamentary Papers: Report from Commissioners: Railways, 1867, vol. 38, part 1, p. liii, 
paragraph 118. 
21 Parliamentary Papers: Report from Commissioners: Railways, 1867, vol. 38, part 1, p. cvii, 
paragraph 2. 
22 Parliamentary Papers 1840, vol. 13, p. 285 (479), paragraph 4,862. 
23 Parliamentary Papers 1840, vol. 13, pp. 242–43 (436–37), paragraphs 4,249–4,265. 
24 Hawke, Railways, p. 40. 
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TABLE 1 
MILES TRAVELED IN 1865  
  1st Class  2nd Class  3rd Class   
Standard  Season  Standard Season  Standard Season  Total 
1 Rail costs 
(£ million) 3.2 0.2 4.3 0.1 4.6 0.03  12.5 
2 Rail fares 
(d / mile) 2.11 1.055 1.55 0.775 1.01 0.505   
3 Miles (million) 367 52 659 43 1,089 12  2,223 
4 Miles (million) 420  702  1,101  2,223 
Note: Rounding errors make these numbers trivially different to those given in Hawke, Rail-
ways, p. 43. 
Sources: Row 1: Railway Returns; row 2: Hawke, Railways, p. 43 and text; row 3: row 1 / row 2. 
by class is not generally available, but is given in the 1875 Railway Re-
turns.
25
 This shows that 58 percent of season ticket revenues came from 
first class, 35 percent from second class, and the remaining 7 percent from 
third class.
26
 We assume that this ratio holds for all years, and that the 
price per mile was one-half the regular fare. This second assumption is ar-
bitrary but plausible. It gives an overall average season ticket fare of 
0.92d, very close to Hawke’s assumption of 0.9d (see Table 1). 
TIME SAVINGS 
 We noted earlier that the modern transport literature views the cost of 
transport as a generalized cost, made up of money and nonmoney com-
ponents. Although this method of expression is relatively new, the con-
cept is not. Lardner, for example, included the time saving in his analy-
sis of the importance of railways, and the Select Committee of 1854 and 
Royal Commission of 1903–1904 were also aware of the issue.
27
 The 
modern economic literature is clear that all time, including nonworking 
time, has a positive value. 
 In the nineteenth century trains were much faster and often much 
more frequent than coaches, and became both faster and more frequent 
over time. Furthermore, train companies believed that customers valued 
speed: it played an important part of their advertising strategy, and they 
were keen to set new records. In addition, faster trains were generally 
more costly to operate, so given increasing speeds, we know that railway 
companies believed that passengers were prepared to pay more for faster 
25 Parliamentary Papers 1876, vol. 65, p. 98 (p. 226). 
26 Hawke assumed that all season ticket holders paid a third-class fare and so treats them as 
third-class passengers for his analysis. 
27 Lardner, Railway Economy, p. 164; Parliamentary Papers 1854–1855, vol. 10 quarto, 
pp. 1220–21; and Parliamentary Papers 1906, vol. 46, pp. 675–77. 
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travel. This would also fit with the finding that Britain had faster trains 
than elsewhere in Europe: as the richest country, British people were ra-
tionally prepared to pay more to save a given amount of time, and train 
companies catered for their needs accordingly.
28
 In addition, the fastest 
trains within Britain often required the purchase of an express ticket, 
demonstrating a willingness on the part of travelers to pay to save time.
 There were two contemporaneous estimates of the value of faster 
travel in Victorian Britain. Lardner argued that in 1848 coaches traveled 
at 7.5 mph and trains at 25 mph. With 170 million passenger miles the 
time saved amounted to just under 16 million hours, which at Lardner’s 
value of time of 6d per hour implies a saving of £0.4 million.
29
 Cham-
bers’ Journal, discussing the railways in 1854, was more optimistic, ar-
guing that 111 million passenger hours were saved, which, even at a 
lower value of time of 4.5d per hour, gave a saving of £2 million.
30
 In 
addition, in his “high estimate” of social savings for 1865, Gourvish in-
cludes £1 million for the value of time saved in 1865, whereas James 
Foreman-Peck notes simply that “it should be” included.
31
 In order to value the time saved, we first calculate average travel 
speeds by rail and prerail methods, from which we calculate the number 
of hours saved. We do this using both the actual journey time itself, and 
including an allowance for the lag when the train (or coach) does not de-
part at the traveler’s preferred time. We then assess the value of one hour 
of time saved, and use that to calculate the value of total time saved. 
Train Speeds
Although we know that trains were faster than coaches, and that train 
speeds increased over time, there has been no systematic study of aver-
age train speeds. That is not to say that we know nothing—Ernest Fox-
well and Thomas Farrer, for example, give good data on the number and 
speed of express trains between 1871 and 1888—but nevertheless our 
knowledge is surprisingly weak given the extent of the railway litera-
ture.
32
 Thankfully, the surviving railway timetables mean that we are in 
28 Foxwell and Farrer, Express Trains, pp. 66, 163–79. 
29 Lardner, Railway Economy, p. 164. 
30 Quoted in Simmons, Victorian Railway, p. 373. 
31 He assumes coach and rail speeds of 10 and 30 mph respectively, but only attributes value 
to the time of 20 percent of passengers, that is, 445.69m passenger miles, with time valued at 8d 
per hour. Gourvish, Railways, p. 59. Foreman-Peck, New Perspectives.
32 Foxwell and Farrer, Express Trains, pp. 66–69. Thus, for example, Bagwell’s generally au-
thoritative book makes no mention of railway speeds prior to 1914 (Bagwell, Transport Revolu-
tion), Ville simply writes of “substantial improvements in speeds.” Ville, “Transport,” p. 307; 
whereas Thomas notes only that “Locomotives roared through the countryside at speeds of up to 
40 miles per hour,” Thomas, “Service Sector,” p. 102. 
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a good position to calculate the speed of any given train journey. Brad-
shaw’s Railway Timetables, published monthly, give the scheduled time 
of departure and arrival for every train in the United Kingdom, and Alan 
Bates’s Directory of Stage Coach Services does the same for coaches in 
1836.
33
 It is obviously not practical to computerize every journey, and 
nor, having done so, would we be able to allocate passengers to each 
journey with any degree of accuracy. Instead we construct two samples, 
consisting of 50 “important” and 222 “minor” journeys respectively.
34
 The important routes are defined by the likely traffic on them.
35
These include the obvious intercity pairs, such as London to Birming-
ham, but also many shorter but high density routes, such as London to 
Reading and Manchester to Oldham.
36
 For these 50 routes we comput-
erized every journey on each route in 1836, 1850, 1870, 1887, and 
1910. The timetables give the time of every journey during the day, but 
simply averaging these would overstate the average time taken, because 
people will not take an earlier train if it will be overtaken en route by a 
later-leaving, but faster-traveling, service.
37
 We eliminate trains and 
coaches that were overtaken, which leaves 342 “useful” coach journeys 
for 1836, and an average of 884 “useful” train journeys for each of the 
four railway benchmark years. We average the times taken by these 
trains on each route, and then average across routes to find the overall 
average for that year.
38
 We calculate miles per hour by dividing the 
33 Of course, neither trains nor coaches would always have operated precisely to their time- 
tables, but it seems more likely that punctuality was better on the railways than on coaches, and 
that punctuality improved over time. Thus although timetables will overstate the true speeds, the 
effect is likely to be small and declining over time. Bradshaw, “Bradshaw’s”; and Bates, Directory.
34 Sample size was determined to generate stable results. Thus, for example, the additional of 
journeys 45–50 did not alter our speed estimates; similarly, restricting our minor journeys sam-
ple to looking only at places with a population of over 15,000 does not alter our estimates. This 
gives us confidence that our sample generates accurate results. 
35 We ranked journeys by the product of the population of the two places, divided by the dis-
tance. This captures two intuitions: that more journeys will be made when there are more people 
in the two places (the benefit of travel increases), but that there are likely to be fewer journeys if 
the distance is long (the cost of travel increases). In effect this model assumes that people travel 
to meet other people, rather than to visit a scenic place, such as the seaside, and has the charac-
teristics of a gravity equation. 
36 A full list is given in the Appendix. 
37 For tractability we limit ourselves to weekday trains. 
38 Rather than using a simple average for each route, we follow best practice and use a “twin-
peak” weighted average, that is, we assume more people wish to travel at peak times than at off-
peak times, and give higher weight to trains at those times in calculating the average speeds on 
each route in each benchmark year. We experimented with many different weightings, including 
uniform demand over the 24 hour period. Contrary to expectations, the pattern of demand does 
not alter the results by more than a few minutes, and does not alter the final social savings re-
sults. Both coaches and trains were sufficiently frequent, and uniform enough in speed, that the 
precise allocation of passengers to individual trains is of no great importance. Route speeds are 
averaged in proportion to the route’s importance, as defined by the likely traffic on the route. 
We assume any passenger could have traveled on any train. In reality this was not the case in 
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“crow flies” mileage between the two towns by the time taken. We use 
“crow flies” rather than “track” or “road” miles because this is what 
matters to travelers. This also has the useful property that the construc-
tion of a shorter line, on which trains travel at the same speed, counts as 
an increase in speed.
39
 As a rule of thumb, track mile speeds exceed 
crow flies speeds by around 15 percent. 
 Speeds on important routes were higher than on more minor routes. 
To find the speeds on minor routes we took a simple average of the 
speed of the first train after 7AM into each of the 222 towns with a 
population over 12,500 in 1901, in each of our four railway benchmark 
years.
40
 We do not know the times of coaches on these routes, so we 
simply assume that they traveled at the same speed as coaches on pri-
mary routes. This is generous towards coaches, because both the quality 
of roads and reduced competition on minor routes would have reduced 
coaching speeds. We average the speeds on important and minor jour-
neys to find the overall average speed for each of our benchmark 
years.
41
 The results are given in Table 2. The equivalent speeds for 
coaches are 7.8 mph,
42
 and for walking we use a value of 2.5 mph, the 
highest figure recommended by the Ramblers’ Association for estimat-
ing journey speeds.
43
 This is a relatively generous figure, because it 
only applies to adults walking on level or downhill routes, and is a 
route-miles speed, not a crow flies speed. It would certainly be possible 
to make a good case for, say, a crow flies speed of 2 mph. 
                                                                                                          
the early years, when not all trains had third-class carriages. This bias is small, because only a 
small proportion of passengers traveled in third class in the early years. 
39 Thus, for example, the Great Western Railway shortened routes from London to South 
Wales and the West by building new cuttings through hills it previous detoured around. As 
such, it lost its nickname of the “Great Way Round.” Cain, “Railways,” p. 93. 
40 Journeys over two hours were excluded, and the remainder varied from the very short 
(Glossop to Dinting, 1 km) to the rather long (Peterborough to Doncaster 120 km), the average 
was 28 km. The towns are listed in the Appendix. 
41 We give important journeys a weighting of 52 percent. This is based on working out the 
implicit demand for travel between each of the 185 towns and each of the other 36,000 settle-
ments in Britain listed in the Ordnance Survey Gazetteer, according to the earlier formula that 
implicit demand equals the product of populations divided by the distance, with a minimum dis-
tance of 5 km. Of total implicit demand, we assume that the average speed for important jour-
neys holds only for those journeys themselves, with other journeys over 120 km being proxied 
by the simple average of important and minor journeys speeds, and all other journeys under 
120 km by the minor journey speed. It is possible to argue for different weights, but given the 
numbers it is hard to see the overall average presented here being wrong by more than two or 
three miles per hour at most. 
42 Bates, Directory, important routes. 
43 http://www.ramblers.org.uk/info/practical/navigation.html#Planning. The recommendation 
is three to four km per hour, we use four km. Summerhill uses three km per hour, but it seems 
likely that walking speeds were higher in England and Wales owing to better quality roads and 
higher nutritional standards. Summerhill, “Big Social Savings,” p. 85. 
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TABLE 2 
“IN-TRAIN” TRAIN SPEEDS AT DIFFERENT DATES, CROW FLIES MILES PER HOUR 
  Important Journeys  Minor Journeys  All Journeys 
1850  22.7  17.8  20.1 
1870  28.4  18.4  23.2 
1887  32.8  18.9  25.6 
1910  36.9  20.4  28.3 
Source: Bradshaw’s Railway Directories. 
 Table 2 shows that train speeds on important routes were considera-
bly higher than on minor ones, and grew more quickly over time. Minor 
journeys generally stopped at more stations en route, which limited the 
potential for cutting journey times. Overall, a rise in speeds from 7.8 
and 2.5 mph in the prerailway era to 20 and then later to 28 mph in the 
railway era represents a major improvement in quality for consumers. 
Table 3 sets out the number of hours saved. 
 Railways were much faster than the alternatives. The time needed to 
travel fell by over eighty percent, to 99 million hours. It is worth em-
phasizing that this figure is robust. Were trains to have been 10 percent 
slower, the overall time saved would fall by under 2.5 percent. In con-
trast, were William Summerhill’s assumption that walkers would have 
averaged 2 miles per hour, rather than 2.5, to be accurate, the number of 
hours saved would increase by more than 20 percent, to 595 million 
hours. As we have noted, our assumption of 2.5 miles per hour is the 
highest plausible average and as such the number of hours saved is al-
most certainly too low rather than too high. The vast majority—over 
three-quarters—of time saved was saved by third-class travelers, both 
because they represented the largest single category of traveler, and be-
cause their alternative methods of transport—walking, or wagons mov-
ing at walking pace—were very slow. As with all social savings num-
bers, we need to be careful as to how these figures are used. Just as 
Hawke’s social saving figure of £48 million did not mean that society 
spent £48 million less on transport in 1865 than at some previous date, 
neither does Table 3 mean that 485 million hours were actually saved. 
Rather, it tells us that to make the journeys made by rail, without the 
railways, would have taken an additional 485 million hours. 
Service Frequency
 We know that trains were more frequent than coaches, and that peo-
ple value frequency, because it reduces the overall journey time. Con-
temporaries appreciated this. Thus Mr. Edward Bury, superintendent of 
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TABLE 3 
TIME SAVINGS IN 1865 
    1st Class  2nd Class  3rd Class  Total 
1 Miles (million)  420 702 1,101 2,223 
2 Prerail speed (mph)  7.8 7.8 2.5
3 Prerail time (million hours)  54 90 440 584 
4 Rail speed (mph)  22.4 22.4 22.4
5 Rail time (million hours)  19 31 49 99
6 Time saved (million hours)  35 59 391 485 
Sources: Row 1: table 1; row 2: see text; row 3: row 1 / row 2; row 4: table 2, by interpolation; 
row 5: row 1 / row 4; row 6: row 3 – row 5 
locomotive power on the London and Birmingham Railway, told the 
1840 Committee on Railways that “The great advantage to the public 
will be, in not having a single train per day carrying all the passengers 
that go, but in having a multiplicity of trains throughout the day,” add-
ing later in his evidence that “I think the public would not have the con-
venience the railway ought to give them, unless there were frequent 
trains.”
44
 Competing coaches, in contrast, often departed at similar 
times to each other, so that passengers wanting to leave at other times 
would have faced long waits. This was particularly true for longer jour-
neys. Thus, for example, all London to Leeds and London to Liverpool 
services departed in the afternoon, whereas the six coaches to Manches-
ter all went either first thing in the morning, or in the early evening, 
with no departures between 8.30AM and 5.30PM, or after 7.45PM.
45
 That 
said, passengers could choose their departure times for two modes of 
travel: walking, and traveling in a private chaise. 
 We model the effects of changing frequencies. For very frequent ser-
vices (say, six per hour or more), the evidence is that people turn up 
randomly, and catch the next available service. In this case average 
waiting time (half the service interval) can simply be added to the jour-
ney time. When frequencies decrease, people cease to arrive at the sta-
tion randomly. Although this means that average waiting times at the 
station do not increase much as frequencies decline, passengers do incur 
disutility because the train does not go at the time that they would like it 
to, forcing them to remain in one place when they would by definition 
rather be in another. They can use the time in the original place, but it is 
worth less to them than that time would be at their destination. The 
transport economics literature converts the nominal waiting time (the 
time between preferred and the actual departure time), into what is 
44 Parliamentary Papers 1840, vol. 13 p. 112 (306), paragraph 2,327, p. 115, (309), paragraph 
2,392.
45 Bates, Directory, pp. 30, 32, 34–36. 
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termed “in-vehicle time” (IVT) equivalent minutes. This is the addi-
tional in-vehicle time assessed as having equal disutility to the delay in 
leaving. Waits of up to ten minutes are simply added onto the journey 
time, but (nominal) waits of over ten minutes are valued less highly, be-
cause the person can do something in their place of departure. 
 Mark Wardman reports that current U.K. practice is to convert nomi-
nal waiting times into in-vehicle equivalent times by multiplying the 
former by one for times up to ten minutes, and by 0.8, 0.55, and 0.43 for 
half-hourly, hourly and two-hourly services.
46
 There is no best practice 
for the value of very long gaps between services, so we use an arbitrary 
but plausible value of 0.1 for 12-hourly gaps. We then convert these ob-
servations into a smooth series.
47
 This tells us that a departure 30 min-
utes after the passenger would like to leave has the same disutility as 
one that departs at exactly the preferred time, but takes 23 minutes 
longer. Similarly a one hour gap is equivalent to a 35 minute longer 
journey, a two hour gap to 51 minutes, and a 12 hour gap to 82 minutes. 
The falling marginal cost reflects the fact that the longer you have, the 
better you are able to deploy your time usefully, and so the marginal 
disutility is lower. 
 There were almost four times as many useful services on important 
routes in 1910 as in 1836 or 1850, but there were still sufficient coach 
and train services in the earlier years that increasing frequencies did not 
radically alter the pattern of overall improvement given by the in-
vehicle speeds themselves. The same is true for trains on minor jour-
neys. As we noted earlier, we recorded details of the first train to arrive 
after 7AM in each town, and so the wait after 7AM can reasonably be 
taken as a measure of the nominal waiting time. This falls from 74 to 53 
minutes between 1850 and 1910, or 34 to 30 IVT equivalent minutes—a 
trivial improvement. The hardest calculation to make is the fall in wait-
ing times from coaches to the initial trains, because we have virtually no 
information about coaches on minor journeys. That said, the issue is 
second order, as only second-class passengers are assumed to travel by 
coach. If we assume one coach per day on minor routes the average 
nominal wait would be 12 hours, equivalent to 82 IVT minutes, which 
reduces the average speed from 7.8 mph to 5.6 mph. In contrast we as-
sume that both private coaches and walkers did not have to wait at all: 
both could set out at a time of their choosing. The full results are given 
46 Wardman, “Public Transport,” paragraph 2.5. 
47 We regress these conversion factor onto time and log time, to get the result that the conver-
sion factor equals 1.58 + 0.0002time – 0.57logtime. This predicts values of 0.99, 0.75, 0.58, 
0.43 and 0.1 for gaps of 11, 30, 60, 120 and 1,440 minutes, very close to the values given by 
Wardman.
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TABLE 4 
TRAIN SPEEDS AT DIFFERENT DATES, CROW FLIES MILES PER HOUR, INCLUDING 
ALLOWANCE FOR WAITING 
  Important Journeys  Minor Journeys  All Journeys 
1850  19.4  11.1  15.1 
1870  24.2  11.2  17.4 
1887  28.2  11.7  19.6 
1910  32.0  13.0  22.1 
Notes. The equivalent speeds on all journeys are 7.8mph for chaises, 5.6mph for coaches, and 
2.5mph for walking.  
Source: Bradshaw’s Railway Directories. 
in Table 4, and comparing Tables 2 and 4 shows that including fre-
quency does not alter the pattern of change over time in any meaning-
ful way. 
 Again, combining our data for miles traveled with the speed data in 
Table 4 allows us to calculate the number of hours saved, including an 
allowance for waiting (see Table 5). Including frequency in the analy-
sis proves to have little effect, with an overall time saving different 
by under 1 percent. This is caused by two factors. First, the delay to 
second-class passengers in waiting for the relatively infrequent stage 
coach was sufficient to offset the delays for first- and third-class pas-
sengers waiting for the train. Second, Britain was already a remarka-
bly developed economy prior to the railway. Stage coach services 
were particularly extensive on core routes, but were also well estab-
lished on relatively minor cross country journeys. Bates records regu-
lar, usually daily, services on 786 different routes excluding those 
that started or ended in London.
48
 The finding that the British trans-
port system was well developed in the prerailway era fits with recent 
work by Dan Bogart, which looks at the significance of turnpike 
trusts in speeding up coach journeys.
49
 It is also in keeping with re-
cent work by Nicholas Crafts and Abay Mulatu, which finds that 
British railways did not lead to a geographical relocation of produc-
tion: previous transport had been sufficiently good to allow industry 
to be located in economically efficient locations.
50
 Because the fig-
ures for time saved are so similar, we limit ourselves to considering 
only in-vehicle time saved. 
48 Bates, Directory, pp. 85–138. 
49 Bogart, “Tunpike Trusts.” 
50 Crafts and Mulatu, “Location.” 
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TABLE 5
TIME SAVINGS IN 1865, INCLUDING THE EFFECTS OF FREQUENCY 
  1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class Total
1 Miles (million)  420 702 1,101  2,223 
2 Prerail speed (mph)  7.8 5.6 2.5   
3 Prerail time (million hours)  54 125 440  620 
4 Rail speed (mph)  16.9 16.9 16.9   
5 Rail time (million hours)  25 42 65  132 
6 Time saved (million hours)  29 84 375  488 
Notes: These results are robust to any plausible change in rail speeds, but upwardly sensitive to 
any downward revision to walking speeds. 
Sources: Row 1: Table 1; row 2: see text; row 3: row 1 / row 2; row 4: Table 2 and text; row 5: 
row 1 / row 4; row 6: row 3 – row 5.  
The Value of Time Saved
As we noted earlier, the value of time saved during working hours is 
taken as the gross wage rate.
51
 For 1867 Edwin Chadwick estimated that 
the average wage of a third-class passenger was 6.5d per hour.
52
 This is 
around twice Charles Feinstein’s estimate of average working-class 
earnings for men and women at this date, reflecting that fact that even 
third-class rail travel was relatively expensive and travelers correspond-
ingly more affluent than average. The average member of the working 
class could afford to travel a little over three miles for one hour’s 
wages, approximately one-tenth of the distance that a modern typical 
British worker could travel for the same effort.
53
 In keeping with the 
modern literature, we assume people who traveled in premium classes 
(in this case first- and second-class travel) were affluent, and value their 
time at 16.8d per hour, which, when indexed via the Feinstein wage se-
ries, equates to £250 per 2,300 hour year in 1911, a decent but not spec-
tacular wage.
54
 The next issue is the proportion of people traveling during work time, 
and the proportion of commuting and leisure travel. As we noted earlier, 
those traveling on business should have their time proxied by wage 
costs, whereas those who were traveling in their own time should have 
51 In modern studies it is necessary to include overhead costs, but there were no payroll taxes 
and few employer-funded benefits in the nineteenth century, so overhead costs would have been 
small enough for us to disregard them without any significant loss of precision. 
52 Edwin Chadwick, Parliamentary Papers: Report from Commissioners: Railways, 1867, vol. 
38, part 1, p. 838, paragraph 17,181. 
53 Average earnings for both sexes. Feinstein, “New Estimates,” p. 604. In that this figure is 
for the United Kingdom, it understates wages in England and Wales, although the margin of er-
ror will be small. 1882–1912 using Feinstein, “Changes,” appendix 24, p. 264; and 1843 to 1882 
using Feinstein, “Pessimism Perpetuated,” p. 653. 
54 This is the average salary of those in Census class V, Merchants etc., using information 
from Routh, and assuming that commercial travelers earned £99 a year, Routh, Occupation
1906–79, p. 63. 
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TABLE 6 
VALUING TIME SAVED IN 1865 
  1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class  Total 
1 Time saved (million hours)  35 59 391  485 
2 Value of one working hour (d)  16.8 16.8 6.5   
3 Value of time saved (£ million)  2.5 4.1 10.6  17.2 
4 Value of one nonworking hour (d)  8.4 8.4 6.5   
5 Value of time saved (£ million)  1.2 2.1 10.6  13.9 
Notes: Row 1: Table 3; rows 2 and 4: see text; row 3: row 1 ? row 2; row 5: row 1 ? row 4. 
their time valued at half their take-home wages if the time saved 
would otherwise have been spent in a train or carriage, and at their 
wage rate if the time saved would otherwise have been spent walk-
ing. We simply do not know what proportion of travelers in any class 
were traveling on business in 1865. The sensible way to proceed is to 
assume first that all travel was on business, and second that no travel 
was on business, and then to consider the plausible bounds within 
these extreme cases. 
 Table 6 gives a range of figures from £14 million to £17 million 
depending on the proportion of premium class passenger traveling on 
business. It seems implausible to believe that—say—less than one-
quarter or more than three-quarters were traveling in work time. As 
such, the plausible bounds are £14.7 million—£16.3 million. Our 
central estimate—£15.5 million—simply assumes that half of those 
in premium classes were on business. It is possible to argue for other 
proportions traveling on business, but it would seem hard to imagine 
that this estimate is out by more than £1 million. Similarly, because 
we have good evidence for the average wage of those traveling by 
third class, it is only the wage that we assign to the premium-class 
passengers that is a source of possible error. Again, the size of any 
error is limited: were we to raise or lower that wage by as much as a 
third, the estimate of the value of time saved would change by only 
10 percent. £15.5 million is a significant sum, and represents over 2 
percent of GDP. Time savings clearly mattered.
MONETARY COSTS 
 Table 7 sets out Hawke’s estimates of the monetary savings that 
came from the railway’s invention. He assesses the alternative cost of 
travel in 1865 at £60m, which gives a social saving of £48 million, or 
5.8 percent of GDP. 
652 Leunig
TABLE 7
SOCIAL SAVINGS: HAWKE’S 1865 ESTIMATES 
   1st Class  2nd Class  3rd Class  Season  Total 
1 Miles (million)  367 659 1,089 106  2,220 
2 Rail fares (d / mile)  2.11 1.55 1.01 0.9   
3 Rail costs (£ million)  3.2 4.3 4.6 0.4  12.5 
4 Prerail fares (d / mile)  24 4 2.5 2.5   
5 Prerail costs (£ million)  36.7 11.0 11.3 1.1  60.1 
6 Rail saving (£ million)  33.5 6.7 6.8 0.7  47.7 
Note and Source: rounding errors make these numbers trivially different to those given in 
Hawke Railways, pp. 43–44. 
Revisions to Hawke’s Money Social Savings 
 We make three revisions to the calculation of monetary social savings 
for 1865. First, we noted earlier that data from the Railway Returns al-
lows us to allocate season ticket holders more accurately across 
classes.
55
 We assume, unlike Hawke, that first-class season ticket hold-
ers would have traveled as did other first-class ticket holders in the ab-
sence of railways. This seems more plausible than assuming that they 
would travel as did third-class ticket holders: even at half the standard 
first-class price per mile, a first-class season ticket was not cheap, and 
such a person must have been from the more affluent part of society. 
Ceteris paribus, this raises the social savings estimate, because it in-
creases the number of counterfactual journeys estimated to have been 
made using post-chaise and inside coach seats. 
 Hawke reports coaching costs as 4d inside, and 2.5d outside, similar 
to figures given elsewhere.
56
 He gives the cost of posting as 2s per per-
son per mile, which cannot be correct. Fishlow drew attention to the 
very high—6:1—ratio between the cost of posting and the cost of trav-
eling inside a carriage.
57
 No other author suggests such a ratio, with 
Bagwell, for example, arguing that the cost of posting was “at least 
twice as expensive” as traveling inside a coach. The 2s cost, mentioned 
in the Royal Commission and elsewhere, is in fact for a post-chaise per 
mile, not per person per mile.
58
 As a chaise could carry three or four 
55 Parliamentary Papers 1876, vol. 65, p. 98 (p. 226). 
56 Copeland, Roads, p. 93. As Gourvish has noted, Hawke mistakenly used the cost of inside, 
rather than outside, the coach for second-class rail travel in his table II.02 Lardner counterfac-
tual, which overstates the social saving by a quarter. The number given in the text on page 44 is 
correct. Gourvish, Railways, p. 34; and Hawke, Railways, p. 44, table II.02. 
57 Fishlow, “Railways,” p. 76. 
58 Parliamentary Papers: Report from Commissioners: Railways, 1867, vol. 38, part 1, p. liii, 
paragraph 118. Charging per coach rather than per person is to be expected because the costs 
were essentially invariant in the number of passengers. This is generally clear from the context, 
but is made explicit in a 1761 advert in The Ipswich Journal, the 1802 accounts of a Suffolk 
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people, the cost per mile was between 6d (four people in the chaise) and 
2s (one person).
59
 There are two further reasons to believe that posting 
was on average cheaper than 2s per mile. First, the cost of posting var-
ied in time and space, with many references to costs lower than 2s. 
Early-nineteenth-century editions of The Times include four references 
to the cost of hiring a chaise being 1s, eight to 1s 3d, and two to 1s 6d. 
There are no references to costs above this, although one reference 
notes that the cost had fallen to 1s 6d, implying that they had once been 
higher, and higher prices were perhaps less likely to be advertised.
60
 In 
their evidence to the 1837 Committee on taxation, both Henry Gray and 
Thomas Cass argued that they would be able to provide posting at 1s 
per mile were the tax to be abolished.
61
 Similarly, John Copeland re-
ports various early-nineteenth-century advertisements for a post chaise 
and pair of horses at 1s–1s 6d per mile.
62
 Although tolls may have been 
in addition, it is clear that some journeys could be done “post haste” for 
less than 2s per mile. Finally, it seems likely that the 2s included the 
cost of hiring a postillion to return the horses at the end of the stage, and 
the tolls on the horses on their return. Given that the average first-class 
rail journey was under 15 miles long in 1865, some journeys would 
have been short round trips for which it would have been cheaper, when 
traveling by chaise, to have retained the horses at the destination until 
return, rather than paying the postillion and tolls for the return legs.
63
We have no reliable information as to how many people traveled in the 
typical chaise, but given that they could carry three and perhaps four 
people, and given that 2s appears to be towards the upper end of  
                                                                                                          
postmaster, a 1793 article in The Leicester Journal, and the 1823 Best family account books, all 
quoted in Copeland, Roads, pp. 155–59. In addition, articles in The Times always refer to the 
cost of hiring a chaise and pair per mile, with no suggestion that this is per person per mile. See 
references in note 28 
59 Mr. Henry Gray, Chairman of the Association of the Postmasters, when interviewed on 
post horse duty, stated in answer to the question “How have you calculated how many passen-
gers on an average you carry post, for each horse hired?—Two I should say, four is considered 
the average with a pair horse carriage,” Parliamentary Papers 1837, vol. 20, p. 9 (305), para-
graph 145. 
60 References to 1s: Issue 5400, 26 April 1802, p. 3, column C; issue 11570, 29 May, 1822, 
p. 3, column A, issue 11598, 01 July 1822, p. 3, column F, and issue 11822, 18 March 1823, 
p. 3, column D. References to 1s 3d: Issue 5198, 29 August 1801, p. 3, column A; issue 5202, 
3 September 1801, p. 2, column C; issue 8343, 17 October 1814, p. 2, column D; issue 9450, 
21 February 1815, p. 3, column G; issue 11152, 24 January 1821, p. 4, column A; issue 11217, 
11 April 1821, p. 3, column A; issue 11822, 18 March 1823, p. 3, column D, and issue 11873, 
16 May 1823, p. 4, column D. References to 1s 6d: Issue 7246, 1 January 1808, p. 3, column, B 
and issue 9008, 6 September 1813, p. 3, column E. 
61 Parliamentary Papers 1837, vol. 20, p. 9 (305), paragraph 145, p. 11 (307), paragraph 178. 
62 Copeland, Roads, p. 155, see also similar figures on pp. 156–60. 
63 369 million miles divided between 25,053,443 passengers, both from Railway Returns, 
Parliamentary Papers 1866, vol. 63, p. 36. 
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TABLE 8
REVISED ESTIMATES OF 1865 MONETARY SOCIAL SAVINGS 
   1st Class  2nd Class  3rd Class  Total 
1 Miles (million)  420 702 1,101  2,223 
2 Rail fares (d / mile)  1.98 1.50 1.00   
3 Rail costs £ million  3.5 4.4 4.6  12.5 
4 Prerail fares (d / mile)  10 4 0   
5 Prerail costs £ million  17.5 11.7 0  29.2 
6 Rail saving £ million  14.0 7.3 –4.6  16.7 
Notes: Fares are the weighted average of standard and season ticket fares.  
Sources: Rows 1–3: Table 1, row 4: see text; row 5: row 1 ? row 4; row 6: row 5 – row 3. 
the likely cost per chaise mile, an average cost of 10d per passenger 
mile seems reasonable.
64
 This estimate—2.5 times the inside coach 
cost—is in keeping with Bagwell’s statement that posting was “at least 
twice as expensive” as coaching. That statement also gives us plausible 
bounds for sensitivity analysis, namely 8–12d per passenger mile. Fi-
nally, as we noted earlier, we assume that third-class passengers would 
not, in the absence of the railways, have traveled by coach, but would 
instead have walked. Both of these last two changes reduce the social 
saving available from railways, by reducing the cost of the alternative 
counterfactual means of transport. 
 Notwithstanding the ceteris paribus rise in the estimate of social sav-
ings from the better assignment of season ticket revenues, the figures 
given in Table 8 are much lower than those presented by Hawke. The 
skepticism of Baker and Fishlow proves to be well-founded.
 65
 Hawke’s 
original estimates were criticized for their sensitivity to the cost of post-
ing. That remains a potential criticism of these estimates too, albeit not 
to the same extent. Although 10d per passenger mile is a reasonable es-
timate, it would be possible to make a reasonable case for anything in 
the range 8–12d, although figures outside this range are less plausible. 
Moving to either extreme of this plausibility band would alter the mone-
tary social saving by £3.5 million, or 20 percent. That is clearly a sig-
nificant amount, but it should be noted that these are the extremes of the 
plausible ranges. 
 As we now have a revised figure for the monetary saving, and a fig-
ure for the value of time saved, we can calculate the total social saving. 
64 Mr. Henry Gray, Chairman of the Association of the Postmasters, stated that four would be 
average, but because this is the maximum, it is hard to believe that this was also the average. 
Parliamentary Papers 1837, vol. 20, p. 9 (305), paragraph 145. 
65 The 10d figure can also be applied to other estimates. Thus, for example, Gourvish’s upper-
bound social saving falls from £128.2m to £62.1m, and from 22.9 percent to 12.6 percent of 
England and Wales GDP. Gourvish, Railways, p. 59. 
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TABLE 9
TIME AND MONEY SOCIAL SAVINGS FOR 1865 
(£ million) 
   1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class Total 
% E&W 
GDP
% Total TFP 
Growth
1 Hawke’s social 
saving  33.5 6.7 7.5 47.7 7.3   
2 Value of time 
saved  1.8 3.1 10.6 15.5 2.4  8.3 
3 Revised monetary 
social saving  14.0 7.3 –4.6 16.7 2.6  9.7 
4 Revised total social 
saving  15.9 10.4 6.0 32.2 5.0  17.1 
Notes and Sources: Row 1: Table 7; row 2, Table 6, assuming half of premium traffic was on 
business; Row 3, Table 8; Row 4: row 2 + row 3, except column 8, where monetary saving is a 
percentage of “standard” TFP growth, whereas time and total saving are percentages of “aug-
mented” TFP growth, that is including the value of time saved. Hawke’s third class includes 
season tickets. 
Hawke divides the social saving for railways in England and Wales by 
GDP for the United Kingdom. As Gourvish noted, this is inappropri-
ate.
66
 In his recent work on British regional GDP, Crafts finds that in 
1871 England and Wales accounted for 79 percent of U.K. GDP, a ratio 
that we assume holds for 1865, implying 1865 England and Wales GDP 
of £649 million.
67
 Table 9 tells us that both the time and money savings were signifi-
cant, and of approximately equal magnitude. Together they amount to 
5 percent of England and Wales GDP, one-third lower than Hawke’s es-
timate. For premium passengers the gains were primarily monetary: 
lower fares represent around 90 percent and 70 percent of the total gains 
to first- and second-class passengers respectively. For third-class pas-
sengers the picture is very different: their fares increased by £4.6 mil-
lion, but they saved £10.6 million worth of time. 
 We noted earlier that social savings are equivalent to (cumulative) 
TFP growth. It is thus straightforward to express the social savings re-
sults given here as a percentage of economy wide TFP growth in this 
era. Monetary social savings of 2.6 percent by 1865 equate to an annual 
rate of 0.07 percent between the opening of the Liverpool and Manches-
ter Railway in 1830 and 1865. This accounts for 9.7 percent of econ-
omy-wide TFP growth of 0.75 percent in this era.
68
 In addition, time so-
cial savings of 2.4 percent in 1865 equate to a further TFP increment of 
66 Ibid., p. 36. 
67 Crafts, “Regional GDP.” 
68 Crafts, “Steam,” table 1. The figure is for 1831–1871, we assume that it holds for 1831–
1865.
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0.07 percent per year. Crafts’s economy-wide TFP figures include only 
contributions to measured GDP. Including time savings raises the econ-
omy-wide estimate of TFP to 0.82 percent per annum, of which the 
monetary, time, and total savings from passenger rail improvements 
represent 8.8 percent, 8.3 percent, and 17.1 percent respectively. These 
are large numbers—on this measure railways accounted for one-sixth of 
all productivity improvements in the mid-nineteenth century, and reflect 
the important role of railways in this era. 
 That railways were a “high technology” good can also be demon-
strated by looking at the rate of price falls (TFP growth) compared with 
those elsewhere in the economy. Table 9 shows that the monetary and 
time costs of a representative 1,000 passenger miles of travel in 1865 
were £5 6s 7d and £2 1s 7d respectively. Using prerailway (1830) travel 
technology these costs would have been £12 10s 4d and £9 9s 2d, falls 
of 2.5 percent and 4.4 percent per annum respectively. These are con-
siderably higher than U.K.-wide TFP growth, confirming the status of 
railways as a high technology product. 
 We noted earlier that the social savings methodology overstates the 
gain in consumer surplus, because it implicitly assumes zero price elas-
ticity of demand. Table 10 sets out the ratio of consumer surplus to so-
cial savings at different elasticities. 
 By definition, the different elasticity assumptions give significantly 
different results, from 1.9 percent of GDP to 5 percent of GDP. In their 
analysis of U.S. passenger railways Boyd and Walton assume unitary 
price elasticity, an assumption endorsed by Fogel, and used by others, 
including most recently Summerhill.
69
 In addition, modern transport 
economics uses a similar rule.
70
 Foreman-Peck suggests a value of 1.5, 
based on the experience of the Glasgow and Greenock Railway in 1842. 
Because, however, that railway simultaneously cut prices and improved 
the carriages, that elasticity of 1.5 is the aggregate of the effect of fal-
ling prices and quality improvements, and so must over-estimate the 
price elasticity. The standard value in other historical and contemporary 
studies—unity—implies a reduction in the welfare gain of 42 percent; 
using a value of 1.25 suggests a reduction of 48 percent, so it is safe to 
conclude that consumer surplus rose by one-half, or slightly more than 
one-half, of the social saving estimate, implying a gain to society of at 
least £2.5 million by 1865. 
69 Boyd and Walton and Fogel also give figures for other elasticities, from zero to two, Sum-
merhill also notes other studies that have used unitary elasticity. Boyd and Walton, “Social Sav-
ings,” p. 249, table 3; Fogel, “Notes,” p. 11; and Summerhill, “Big Social Savings,” p. 82. 
70 The “famous rule of a half” is a linear approximation to this. Great Britain, Transport,
p. 65, figure 3.3. 
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TABLE 10
THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT ELASTICITY ASSUMPTIONS ON TOTAL SOCIAL 
SAVINGS IN 1865 
1 Elasticity of Demand 0  0.4  0.75  1  1.5  2 
2 CS / SS (%)  100 80 67 59 46 37 
3 Consumer surplus (£ million)  32.2 25.8 21.5 19.0 15.0 12.1 
4 Consumer surplus as % E&W GDP  5.0 4.0 3.3 2.9 2.3 1.9 
Notes: Row 2 is robust to changes in the various assumptions. For example, raising or lowering 
the cost of coaching by 20 percent alters row 2 by not more than 2 percentage points, while al-
tering the counterfactual speeds also has only the smallest effect.  
Sources: Row 1 is the elasticity levels given in Fogel, “Notes,” p. 12; row 2: the ratio of con-
sumer surplus to social savings generated by Fogel’s formulae; row 3: row 2 ? total social sav-
ing from Table 9; row 4: row 3 / England and Wales GDP (£649 million).  
EXTENDING THE SOCIAL SAVINGS NUMBERS TO 1843–1912 
 We now go on to extend the series to cover the years 1843 to 1912. 
We do this in four parts. First, we assess the fares and miles traveled 
prior to 1865, for which good data are available. Next we assess the 
same for the period after 1865, for which the data are poorer. Third we 
calculate and value the time saved, and finally assess the money sav-
ings. We then discuss the magnitude and changing nature of the results 
over time. 
Data for Years Prior to 1865 
 Hawke uses Lardner’s passenger mile estimates for 1843–1848, and 
the Railway Returns until 1870, when his analysis stops.
71
 We make a 
few small changes to the procedure followed by Hawke. First, he uses 
passenger mileage figures given in the Railway Returns from July 1851 
to December 1859. However, a few companies did not submit passenger 
mileage returns between 1851 and 1855. We add a proportionate allow-
ance to passenger miles, based on their train miles, raising total passen-
ger miles by 1 to 5 percent, depending on the year. Because rail receipts 
remain unaltered, and nonrail costs rise 1–5 percent with the additional 
miles, the social savings rise. The effect is, however, small, never ex-
ceeding 0.3 percentage points. 
 Second, between 1852 and 1859 a few companies, never accounting 
for more than 3 percent of the total passenger miles, did not divide their 
passenger miles by class. Hawke allocates them to the third class, we 
71 Hawke, Railways, pp. 45–47. Gourvish is sceptical about Hawke’s reliance on Lardner, but 
that scepticism is not well founded. Both Lardner and the Railway Returns give figures for 
1845–1848, and the two series are identical. For that reason is seems reasonable to trust Lard-
ner’s figures for 1843–1844. Gourvish, Railways, p. 38; and Lardner, Railway Economy, p. 163. 
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distribute them pro-rata, in line with the average of other companies. 
Again, this raises the social saving, because it increases the alternative 
nonrail cost, without altering the rail cost. The estimate of social sav-
ings rises by a maximum of 0.2 percentage points.
72
 We know both receipts and fares per mile by class for the periods 
1843–1848, July 1851–December 1859, and for 1865. It is therefore 
fairly straightforward to divide the former by the latter to find the num-
ber of passenger miles. We interpolate fares per mile for 1849–June 
1851 and 1860–1864 from observations immediately on either side, and 
use these prices to calculate miles traveled from the receipts given in 
Railway Returns. The price per mile was very stable in this period, so 
this cannot involve any significant error. 
Data for Years After 1865 
 Our numbers for the post-1865 period are, like Hawke’s, less precise 
because no information on average fares is available, and season tickets, 
workman’s and excursion fares become more important. Like Hawke, 
we note William Acworth and W. T. Stephenson’s statement that the 
average fare fell to 0.55d per mile by the outbreak of war.
73
 The issue is 
assessing the pattern of fare reductions between 1865 and 1912. In the 
absence of other evidence, we assume that fares fell linearly over time 
and evenly by class. We assume, therefore, that average fares, including 
all discounts, season tickets, and so on, fell from 2.11d in 1865 to 1.02d 
by 1912, from 1.55 to 0.75d and 1 to 0.5d, in each class respectively. 
This gives an average fare of 0.56d in 1912, which is very close to the 
number proposed by Acworth and Stephenson. There are two other es-
timates of fares, by P. J. Cain and by George Paish. Cain suggests 0.75d 
and 0.6d per mile in 1900 and 1912, which are close enough to our fig-
ures of 0.71d and 0.56d.
74
 Paish gives fares for the five main railway 
companies for 1900, which when averaged give 0.775d per mile.
75
 This 
is higher than both our estimate and that of Cain, probably reflecting 
higher prices on the faster, mainline routes that make up Paish’s sample. 
In short, our figures are plausible, even though they lack the authority of 
the earlier data. We then divide receipts—given in Railway Returns for 
all years—by the estimated fares per mile, to give the number of miles 
traveled in each class. 
72 In general there were more companies with undivided passenger mile figures in years in 
which there were fewer companies submitting no passenger mile data. As such those two in-
crements are to some extent alternatives.  
73 Acworth and Stephenson, Elements, p. 207. 
74 Cain, “Railways,” p. 124. 
75 Paish, Railway Position, pp. 40, 180, 202, 222, and 285. 
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FIGURE 1
ANNUAL PASSENGER MILES, 1843–1912 
Sources: Lardner, Railway Economy; and Railway Returns.
Second-class mileage peaked in 1871, after which time the number 
of second-class passenger miles fell in absolute terms for some years, 
as railway companies began to move to a two-class system (known as 
first and third classes). It was the third class, rather than the first, that 
gained. It would be wrong, however, to assume that people who now 
traveled third class, but would have traveled second class in earlier 
years, would have walked in the absence of the railway. To avoid 
that implication, we construct a pseudo-second class from 1872 on-
wards, which simply follows first-class traffic, at the 1871 first- to 
second-class ratio. The pseudo-third class is then the actual number 
of third-class passengers, less those who are transferred into the 
pseudo-second class.
76
 194 million passenger miles are transferred 
from third class to the pseudo-second class in 1872, rising to 1.4 bil-
lion passenger miles in 1912. This procedure lowers the value of time 
saved, but raises the monetary social savings estimate. For simplicity 
we refer to the pseudo-second and pseudo-third classes simply as 
second and third classes from here on. Both the actual and revised 
mileages are given in Figure 1. 
76 The pseudo second class is 50 percent larger than the actual second class by 1900, whereas 
the pseudo third class is 5 percent smaller than the actual third class. By the end of the period 

























HOURS SAVED NOT INCLUDING WAITING 
Sources: Table 4 and Figure 1. 
Time Savings 
 We assess the value of time saved by combining the data on speeds 
given in Table 4 (with linear interpolations between benchmark years), 
and the passenger miles given in Figure 1. We continue our earlier as-
sumptions that those in first and second classes would otherwise have 
traveled by coach, and that those in third class would otherwise have 
walked.
77
 The number of hours saved rose dramatically over the railway era, 
from 54 million hours in 1843, to 527 million hours in 1866, and finally 
to 5 billion hours by 1912, roughly equal to the hours worked by 1.8 
million workers (see Figure 2). The number of hours saved rises more 
sharply over time than passenger miles, because over time an increasing 
proportion of those traveling by train were third-class passengers. Even 
at the very beginning the third class accounted for over half the hours 
saved, rising to 80 percent by 1860, and 90 percent by 1880. The Royal 
77 Obviously the further on from the invention of the railways, the harder it is to construct a 
plausible nonrail counterfactual. Society was richer in 1912 than 70 years before, and some 
traveling in third class would by then have used the coach rather than walk. Similarly, the bicy-
cle became more practical over time, and fell in price after 1900. The assumption that all third-
class passengers would have walked is therefore less likely to be true for 1912 than for earlier. 
That said, we have already allocated 1.4 billion passenger miles from third to second class—and 
thus from walking to coach, and even in 1907, after the big price falls, only one bicycle was 
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Commission was correct: the poorer classes did benefit most in terms of 
speed.
78
 We now go on to value these hours. For first- and second-class trav-
elers we use an annual wage of £250 in 1911, projected backwards as 
appropriate. For third-class passengers in 1865 we were fortunate to 
have Chadwick’s direct estimate of their wages. It would not be appro-
priate, however, simply to index this wage forward. Over the nineteenth 
century the cost of third-class travel fell relative to workers’ wages. 
Whereas in 1865 workers could travel only 3.3 miles on an hour’s earn-
ings, in 1912 they could travel 10.4 miles on an hour’s wages. That fall 
in price relative to earnings would have brought train travel into the 
reach of more people, although rail travel was still around three times as 
expensive relative to earnings as it is today. Even today rail travel is 
used disproportionately by the affluent, so it is again unrealistic to as-
sume that third-class rail travelers would have been a representative 
cross section of the working class. This conclusion fits with the qualita-
tive literature that notes that railway travel was not used regularly by all 
sections of the working class.
79
 That said, the relatively greater afforda-
bility in 1912 than in 1865 must mean that the difference between the 
average traveler and the average working-class person was smaller in 
1912 than in 1865. We assume, arbitrarily, that the 1912 premium of 
travelers’ to average wages was half that of 1865, with a linear trans-
formation between the two dates.
80
 This is an important assumption. If 
we instead assumed that third-class passengers had average working 
class wages, the estimate of the value of time saved in Table 11 would 
fall by 16 percent, equally, were we to assume that the ratio of third-
class to average working-class passengers was as per Chadwick’s ear-
lier finding, then our estimate would rise by 16 percent. These are not 
small error bounds, and reflect the fact that we have little information 
on the earnings of those who traveled. 
 For years before 1865 we use Chadwick’s wages, indexed via Fein-
stein’s series; this assumption is less critical given the lower numbers of 
third-class passengers early on. Table 11 gives the value of the 5 billion 
hours of time saved assuming first that all travel is in work time and 
second that none of it is in work time. The estimates range from £145 
million to £165 million. As for 1865, neither extreme makes sense, and 
78 Parliamentary Papers: Report from Commissioners: Railways, 1867, vol. 28, part 1, p. liii, 
paragraph 118. 
79 Kellett, Railways, chapter 11, has a good discussion of the means of transport—walking, 
horse drawn omnibus, tram—used by the working class. 
80 The average English person was taking 26 trips per year by the end of the century: such 
volumes of travel indicate that travelers were people of at least moderate means. Weyl, Passen-
ger Traffic, p. 110. 
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TABLE 11
VALUING TIME SAVED IN 1912 
  1st Class  2nd Class  3rd Class  Total 
1 Time saved (million hours) 127 214 4,707 5,048 
2 Value of one working hour (d) 26.7 6.5
3 Value of time saved (£ million) 14.1 23.8 127.3 165.1 
4 Value of one nonworking hour (d) 12.3 6.5
5 Value of time saved (£ million) 6.5 11.0 127.3 144.7 
Notes: Rows 1, 2 and 4: see text; Row 3: row 1 ? row 2; Row 5: row 1 ? row 4. 
using the earlier plausible hypothesis that half of premium traffic was 
for business gives a saving of £155 million, just over 10 percent of Eng-
land and Wales GDP. Again, it is implausible to believe that fewer than 
one-quarter or more than three-quarters of premium-class passengers 
were on business, as such, it is implausible to believe that the correct 
answer is different to our best guess by more that 3 percent. The exer-
cise is set out for 1912 in Table 11, and the results for all years are 
given in Figure 3. 
Money Savings 
 The miles traveled in each year, the railway fares, and the cost of al-
ternative modes of transport found earlier are sufficient to generate the 
monetary social savings estimates at different dates, which are given in 
Figure 4. We have assumed that the nature and costs of alternative 
means of travel would have remained unaltered. It is possible to claim 
that the cost of coaching would have risen (greater demand for horses, 
congestion) or that it would have fallen (economies of scale in coach 
building, better roads), so the assumption of constant prices is reason-
able.
 Figure 1 showed that passenger miles rose 16-fold between 1850 and 
1912. Despite this, Figure 4 shows that the money social savings rose 
only sixfold. As Figure 1 shows, most of the rise in passenger miles was 
in third-class travel. Even when we exclude the proportion of third-class 
passengers who would have traveled second class were it to have been 
offered, we still have a large rise in the number of people who would 
otherwise have walked. For this group, the money social savings are 
negative. The increase in fare revenues from third-class passengers 
partly counteracted the additional savings made by first- and second-
class passengers, for whom the money cost of travel fell sharply. 
 Given that we have imposed a linear fall in the price of tickets be-
tween 1865 and 1912, we should not place too much confidence in the 
pattern of savings between those dates. Our initial starting point in 1865 
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FIGURE 3
THE VALUE OF TIME SAVED, 1843–1912 
Notes: Assumes that half of premium travel is during work time. 
Sources: See the text. GDP is from Crafts, “Regional GDP.” We interpolate linearly between 
Crafts’s benchmark (Census) years, and use the 1871 ratio of England and Wales to U.K. GDP 
for all years prior to 1871. 
is sound, and our final observation in 1912 is in line with both Acworth
and Stephenson and Cain, but the results in between these two dates 
must be viewed as an educated guess. It is probably most sensible to see 
social savings rising to 2.5 percent in the early 1850s, and remaining in 
that region for the next 50 years. 
The Changing Nature and Composition of Social Savings 
 Because we now know both the value of time and money savings for 
each year between 1843 and 1912 we can calculate the total social sav-
ing generated by railways in England and Wales. The three series— 
time, money, and total—are given in Figure 5. The value of time is 
based on the earlier plausible assumption that half of premium travel 
was on business. From 1.5 percent in the early 1840s, the total social 
saving grew rapidly to reach 4.5 percent by the mid-1850s, before 
growing reasonably steadily to reach almost 14 percent by 1912. Fig-
ure 5 also shows that monetary savings became relatively less important 
over time, accounting for around two-thirds of the total social saving in 
the 1840s, falling back to a quarter or below from the mid-1880s on-
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MONEY SOCIAL SAVINGS, 1843–1912 
Notes: See the text. 
way of saving time rather than saving money. Railways also represent a 
reasonably steady proportion of (cumulative) TFP growth throughout 
the period, at around 15 percent. There is no evidence of relative under-
performance of British railways productivity growth as the period pro-
gressed.
 We noted earlier that the social saving overstates the rise in consumer 
surplus. If travel costs had been as high in 1912 as they were before 
railways then far fewer people would have traveled. We set out the for-
mula to convert social savings into consumer surplus above, along with 
our reasons for preferring unitary elasticity. On that basis we calculate 
the consumer surplus for each year in our period. As Figure 6 shows, 
consumer surplus rose steadily, albeit at a slower rate than social sav-
ings. The growing divergence reflects the falls in the (generalized) cost 
of traveling by train: a larger proportion of journeys in 1912 were in-
duced by lower prices than was true earlier in the period when travel 
was slower and fares were higher. A higher proportion of rail journeys 
towards the end of the period would thus not have been undertaken 
without railways: these induced journeys are included in social savings, 
but excluded from consumer surplus. Nevertheless, consumer surplus 
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FIGURE 5
THE SOCIAL SAVINGS FROM PASSENGER RAILWAYS, 1843–1912 
Sources: Figures 3 and 4 
 As Figure 5 showed, the ratio of money to total savings fell over 
time, from three-quarters at the beginning, to one-half in 1866, to one-
quarter in 1883, after which it stabilized at between 20 and 25 percent 
until 1912. The rise in the importance of time relative to money savings 
reflects the changing nature of the railway in this period. Initially rail-
way companies saw the railway as an alternative to coaching, and of-
fered services that were priced and structured accordingly. But from 
1870 onwards, railways became an ever more mass market commodity, 
whereby train companies often aimed to make a profit by conveying 
many people, relatively cheaply, at high load factors. We can see this 
transition in Figure 7, which gives the percentage of total social savings 
that went to premium-class travelers. This shift towards mass transport 
may have been a peculiarly British phenomenon; we know that railway 
penetration was much less extensive in other countries.
81
81 For example, whereas England had 26.5 journeys per capita in the mid 1890s, the figure for 
France was 9.1, lower than the level reached in England in 1864. France was low even by conti-
nental standards, but nonetheless Denmark, Prussia, Netherlands, Saxony, Sweden, and Switzer-
land all lagged significantly behind England in the number of journeys per head, and thus, almost 
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FIGURE 6
THE CONSUMER SURPLUS FROM PASSENGER RAILWAYS, 1843–1912 
Note: “CS/SS” is the ratio of the consumer surplus gain to the social saving gain, using unitary 
elasticity and the Fogel formula set out earlier. 
 Initially premium passengers gained almost all of the benefit—they 
represented the majority of the traffic, and, at the initial price and speed 
combinations, third-class passengers did not gain a large amount of sur-
plus per mile traveled. Over time, however, third class became a larger 
share of total travel, and the rise in speed and fall in prices increased the 
gain per mile for third-class passengers. As such, the premium passen-
gers’ share of gains fell steadily to around one-half from the mid-1890s 
onwards. When, however, we look at the two different types of saving, 
very different pictures emerge. The premium-class passengers always 
gain more than 100 percent of the monetary social saving, because for 
third-class passengers the railways are more expensive than the alterna-
tive. But for time savings the position is very different. Not withstand-
ing that premium passengers’ time is valued much more highly per 
hour, the share of the value of time saved by premium passengers fell 
sharply from three-fifths in 1843 to around two-fifths by 1850, followed 
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FIGURE 7
PROPORTION OF SOCIAL SAVINGS ACCRUING TO PREMIUM CLASS PASSENGERS 
Sources: Figures 3, 4, and 5. 
 This pattern fits with what we know about technological adoption. In 
the initial period, new technology is used in the same way as the previous 
technology. In this case, railways were used to carry the well-to-do in 
comfort, while conditions for those in the third class were very poor, both 
in terms of comfort and convenience.
82
 Only from 1870 did the railways, 
in part under pressure from legislation, and in part under the implicit 
threat of nationalization, appreciate the potential of third-class travel, and 
offer better conditions, greater frequency, and lower fares. Economies of 
scale, in terms of adding extra carriages to services, and extra services to 
routes were the economically sensible strategy in a high fixed cost envi-
ronment. At that point trains became a “new good” for many. Whereas 
before many people could not have realistically expected to travel at all, 
given prohibitive coaching costs, and the high cost of walking in terms of 
time out of the labor market, they could now travel, and they did. As 
such, social savings and to a lesser extent consumer surplus increased as 
a share of GDP, as did the share that came from time saved, and the share 
that went to those new travelers in third class. 

















 This continued increase in the value of railways to society long after 
their invention and adoption fits with what we know about other so-
called “general purpose technologies.” Paul David has shown how ini-
tially electricity had only limited effects on business: it was only when 
factories reorganized production to take account of the possibility of 
unit drives that the productivity revolution occurred.
83
 The same intui-
tion underlies the Solow productivity paradox, that we could see com-
puters everywhere except in the productivity numbers. In the railway 
case it was only when train companies realized that the best use of rail-
ways was for mass transport, including high load factor commuting and 
excursion traffic, that society was able to reap the full benefits. It is an 
open question as to whether the time lag between the railway’s inven-
tion and its use as a mass transit system was caused by technological 
bottlenecks, such as inadequate engine power limiting train lengths, or 
by a significant entrepreneurial failure on the part of railway managers, 
who failed to see a new market until surprisingly late. 
 There is another way in which these findings fit well with the more 
general literature on technology. William Nordhaus has shown that, on 
average, postwar American entrepreneurs in the nonfarm sector cap-
tured only 2.2 percent of the total benefit to society from new inven-
tions. The remaining 97.8 percent went to consumers as additional con-
sumer surplus.
84
 Tony Arnold and Sean McCartney have recently 
compiled data on the return on capital employed for U.K. railways. 
They conclude that although returns were initially reasonable, “From 
that date [1872], however, through to the outbreak of war in 1914, the 
industry’s results, and the returns it was able to provide to its investors, 
were consistently disappointing.”
85
 Although it is not possible to di-
rectly compare the percentage rate of return on capital employed with 
the estimates of social savings or consumer surplus presented here, it is 
clear that ex-post average returns of under 4 percent on capital em-
ployed imply little if any monopoly power, and were far smaller in ab-
solute terms than the average consumer surplus of 3.7 percent of GDP 
over the same period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This article makes a number of contributions. It has calibrated the rise 
in train speeds prior to 1912, and used those results to assess the addi-
tional amount of time that it would have taken to undertake all railway 
83 David, “Computer and Dynamo.” 
84 Nordhaus, “Schumpeterian Profits.” 
85 Arnold and McCartney, “Rates of Return,” pp. 54–55. 
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journeys without railways. The numbers are large, and increased rapidly 
over time: growing tenfold from the mid-1840s to the mid-1860s, and 
then tenfold again by the outbreak of the First World War, at which 
point it would have taken an additional five billion hours to undertake 
all rail journeys without them, using the means of transport that passen-
gers would have chosen in the absence of railways. Trains were much 
faster than coaches or walking, and became faster over time, with aver-
age speeds rising from 20 to 28 miles an hour between 1850 and 1910, 
or 37 miles an hour on more important routes. Although initially less 
important than the money savings offered by railways, the value of time 
saved became as important in the 1860s, and considerably more impor-
tant thereafter. By the mid-1880s, time savings outweighed money sav-
ings by a factor of five. 
 The social savings from railways, in time and money, amounted to 
some 2 percent of GDP as early as 1850, to 5 percent of GDP by 1865, 
10 percent by the end of the century, and fully 14 percent by 1912. Even 
when we use the consumer surplus estimate the gains are significant. At 
the most plausible price elasticity assumption of 1 percent, the con-
sumer surplus benefit from railways represented 6 percent of national 
income in 1912. 
 These savings are significant relative to those available from other 
sources in the nineteenth century. Including the value of time saved by 
passenger railways increases the total level of TFP growth in the econ-
omy by 9 percent, with passenger railways alone accounting for around 
15 percent of total TFP growth in the pre-1913 railway era. They were 
thus a major contributor to aggregate productivity growth in this era. 
 Railways represented a dramatic change in transport technology. The 
cost of travel fell significantly, and its speed and comfort rose dramati-
cally. This is particularly true from the 1870s onwards, as railways 
sought to attract more customers with better third-class services. People 
who could never have expected to travel at all in their lives were able to 
do so for the first time. And those who did travel were able to do so 
more often. This article does not claim to measure all of the benefits of 
railways to travelers, let alone to the economy or society as a whole. 
But it does claim to have calculated the social savings and consumer 
surplus of passenger railways. Those figures show that the contribution 
of railways relative to national income continued to rise over in the Vic-
torian and Edwardian eras, as rail companies discovered new and better 
ways to make this technology valuable to society. As the period pro-
gressed railways offered poor returns to investors, but they delivered 
tremendous welfare gains to travelers and to society. 
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Appendix
50 IMPORTANT ROUTES 
Birmingham-Dudley, Leeds-Bradford, Liverpool-Birmingham, Liverpool-Leeds, 
Liverpool-Preston, Liverpool-Sheffield, London-Bath, London-Birmingham, London-
Bradford, London-Brighton, London-Bristol, London-Cambridge, London-Canterbury,
London-Cardiff, London-Chatham, London-Colchester, London-Coventry, London-
Derby, London-Dover, London-Hull, London-Ipswich, London-Leeds, London-
Leicester, London-Liverpool, London-Maidstone, London-Manchester, London-
Newcastle, London-Northampton, London-Norwich, London-Nottingham, London-
Oldham, London-Oxford, London-Plymouth, London-Portsmouth, London-Preston, 
London-Reading, London-Sheffield, London-Southampton, London-Wolverhampton, 
Manchester-Birmingham, Manchester-Blackburn, Manchester-Bolton, Manchester-
Bradford, Manchester-Leeds, Manchester-Liverpool, Manchester-Macclesfield, Man-
chester-Oldham, Manchester-Preston, Manchester-Sheffield, Manchester-Stockport 
222 TOWNS AT WHICH MINOR JOURNEYS ENDED 
Abergavenny, Alderley Edge, Alfreton, Altrincham, Andover, Ashford, Ashton-
under-Lyne, Barnsley, Barnstaple, Barrow, Barry, Basingstoke, Bath, Bedford, Ber-
wick, Beverley, Birkenhead, Birmingham, Blackburn, Blackpool, Blyth, Bolton, 
Bournemouth, Bradford, Bridgnorth, Bridgwater, Bridlington, Brighton, Bristol, 
Bromsgrove, Burnley, Burslem, Burton on Trent, Bury, Buxton, Cambridge, Cardiff, 
Carlisle, Carnarvon, Castleford, Caterham, Chatham, Chelmsford, Cheltenham, Chert-
sey, Chester, Chesterfield, Chichester, Chorley, Cirencester, Clevedon, Coalville, Col-
chester, Colne, Colwyn Bay, Conway, Coventry, Cowes, Crewe, Darlington, Dartford, 
Dartmouth, Darwen, Denton, Derby, Dewsbury, Doncaster, Dorchester, Dover, Drif-
field, Dudley, East Grinstead, Eastbourne, Eccles, Exeter, Felixstowe, Fleetwood, 
Folkestone, Garston, Gateshead, Glossop, Gloucester, Grantham, Gravesend, 
Grimsby, Halifax, Hanley, Harrogate, Hartlepool, Hastings, Hereford, Heywood, 
Hinckley, Huddersfield, Hyde, Ilkeston, Ipswich, Jarrow, Keighley, Keswick, Kette-
ring, Kidderminster, Kings Lynn, Kingston upon Hull, Kingswood, Kirkby Lonsdale, 
Lancaster, Leamington, Leeds, Leek, Leicester, Leigh, Leighton Buzzard, Lewes, Ley-
land, Lichfield, Lincoln, Liverpool, Llandudno, Llanelly, London, Long Eaton, Long-
ton, Loughborough, Lowestoft, Luton, Lyme Regis, Macclesfield, Maidstone, Mal-
vern, Manchester, Mansfield, Margate, Merthyr Tydfil, Middlesbrough, Middleton, 
Mirfield, Nantwich, Newark, Newcastle, Newcastle under Lyme, Newmarket, New-
port, North Shields, Northampton, Northwich, Norwich, Nottingham, Nuneaton, Old-
ham, Oxford, Padiham, Peterborough, Plymouth, Pontypool, Pontypridd, Portsmouth, 
Preston, Radcliffe, Ramsgate, Reading, Reigate, Rochdale, Rochester, Rodwell, Roth-
erham, Rugby, Runcorn, Sale, Scarborough, Seaford, Selby, Sheffield, Shipley, 
Shrewsbury, Sleaford, Smethwick, South Shields, Southampton, Southport, Sowerby 
Bridge, St Annes, St Helens, St. Albans, St. Austell, Stafford, Stalybridge, Stockport, 
Stockton-on-Tees, Stoke on Trent, Stroud, Sunderland, Sutton Coldfield, Tamworth, 
Taunton, Tewkesbury, Torquay, Tredegar, Tunbridge Wells, Tunstall, Ulverston, 
Wakefield, Wallasey, Wallsend, Walsall, Warrington, Warwick, Watford, Welling-
borough, West Bromwich, Weston super Mare, Widnes, Wigan, Wilmslow, Winder-
mere, Wisbech, Woking, Wolverhampton, Worcester, Wrexham, Yarmouth, York 
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